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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20040914-CA
v.
NILE GENE NELSON,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appealfroma conviction for criminal nonsupport, a third degree felony, in
violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-201 (West 2004), in the Third Judicial District Court
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Denise P. Lindberg, presiding.
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e)
(West 2004).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Did the trial court properly deny defendant's motion for a directed verdict, made at
the close of the state's case-in-chief, where ample evidence showed that defendant failed to
pay court-ordered child support while they were in needy circumstances?
"[The reviewing court] review[s] for correctness the trial court's conclusion that the
evidence established a prima facie case." State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289, \ 8, 988
P.2d 949 (citation omitted), cert denied, 4 P.3d 1289 (Utah 2000).

STATUTE
The following statute is attached at Addendum A:
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 76-7-201 (West 2004).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Defendant was charged with one count of criminal non-support (West 2004). Rl 1820. At the close of the State's case-in-chief, defendant moved for a directed verdict, which
the trial court denied. R210:149-54. A jury convicted defendant of the offense as charged.
R128. The trial court sentenced defendant to a statutory zero-to-five-year term. However,
the court suspended all but ninety days of the sentence, placed defendant on probation, and
ordered him to pay restitution to the Office of Recovery Services ("ORS") at the rate of
$658.00 per month. R166-68. Defendant timely appealed. R187.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The State9s case-in-chief
Christine Nelson was married to defendant from 1976 to 1997, at which point they
divorced. R210:66-68, 77. During their marriage they had four children: Kodi, Brooklee,
Casey, and Steven. R210:67; State's Ex. 1. Defendant and Christine also raised Christine's
daughter of another union, Latosha.1 R210:67-68; State's Ex. 1. The divorce decree ordered
defendant to pay not less than $909 per month in child support for all five children, pursuant

1

The trial court, without objection from defendant, informed the jury that Utah
presumes that "a child born within the confines of a marriage is a child of the two parents
that are legally married." R210:78. Christine admitted that she knowingly indicated in
the divorce proceeding that Latasha was defendant's child. R210:80.
2

to the Utah Uniform Child Support Guidelines, until each child became eighteen years old
or graduated from high school, whichever occurred later. R210:68,76-77; State'sEx. l;Def.
Ex. 4B. From May 1, 1999 through February 28, 2003 ("nonsupport period"), the children
who were under eighteen lived with her—all five beginning in May 1999, and three at time
oftrial. R210:69.
Following her divorce from defendant, Christine worked for the Utah State
Treasurer's Office. R210:69, 90-91. In May 1999, she earned either $ 9.50 or $ 10.00 an
hour. Id. In February 2003, she was earning $ 11.00 an hour. Id. During the nonsupport
period, she received some assistance for her children from a couple of friends, family, and
her church. R210:70-71. During the nonsupport period, her church paid her utilities a couple
of times and provided some food. R210:71. Christine struggled a few times providing
school clothes for her children: "They never went without, but they were not the top of the
line dresses, either." Id. She also had a "hard time" providing food, having had to ask for
help and "kind of watch what we do in order to make it." R210:71-72. There were also "a
couple of times we've had to say no to a basketball team or something like that because of
finances." R210:72. Even with the assistance of friends, family, and her church, Christine
stated that her family was "impacted quite a bit": "I don't know how it would have turned
out[,] but we definitely did need some help at certain times." R210:76.
Christine did receive payments from ORS stemming from garnishment of defendant's
unemployment checks, but she was unsure whether she received such payments during the
nonsupport period. R210:72. She also received payments directly, albeit irregularly and
3

inconsistently, from defendant. Christine acknowledged, however, that "if [some money]
was really needed, [defendant] seemed to be able to come up with it." R210:72-73. She also
always gave defendant receipts for his direct payments. R210:73. Christine did not notify
ORS of defendant's direct payments because she was generally working and was unaware
that ORS had an open case on defendant. Id. However, she had recently given ORS what
she thought was a fair statement of defendant's direct payments during the nonsupport
period. R210:73-74.
On cross-examination, Christine stated that defendant was served with a verified
divorce complaint. R210:81-82; State's Ex. 1. He did not appear in the proceedings and a
default decree of divorce and judgment was issued on August 7,1997. R210:80; State's Ex.
1. At the time of the divorce, Christine was unemployed and had no income; defendant was
employed and was earning $ 2,600.00 a month. R:210:91; State's Ex. 1.
Defense counsel showed Christine her affidavit, written in response to an inquiry from
ORS. R210:82, 99, 102-03. In the affidavit, Christine stated that she had not received any
payments from defendant in 1999, 2000, and 2002 R.210:82-85. She testified, however—
and the affidavit contained her handwritten explanation—that defendant had made some
payments throughout the nonsupport period: "Nile doesn't pay child support on a regular
basis[,] but there are many times when he had [sic] helped me out with $100 here and there.
And I'm approximating that as $2,000." R21:84-86,88,92. Although the affidavit indicated
that Christine's $2,000 estimate applied to 2001, she explained that her estimate related to
the entire nonsupport period, but particularly in 2001. R210:85, 92, 97, 99-100. But
4

Christine acknowledged that in 2001 defendant made payments to her with checks that were
almost all in amounts greater than $100. R210:93-95, 98. Def. Ex. 3.

She also

acknowledged giving defendant a receipt for $1500 worth of repairs he did on her house.
R210:95. Christine did not keep records of defendant's payments and did not know on what
specific dates defendant made payments, but she did not think defendant made payments
every payday. R210:85, 89. She also stated that by the time of trial, defendant had become
"very good about paying[, but a]t the time [in question] he wasn't." Id.
Roberta Casados, an employee with ORS handled defendant's case file during the
nonsupport period. R210:111-13. She prepared a chart recording defendant's payment
history, State's Ex. 2 (Addendum B), that showed all payments that ORS had obtained from
defendant, all by wage withholding: May 1999—$357.45; December 1999—$300; January
2000—$500; February 2000—$400; and March 2000—$300. R210:l 16-18. The payment
history also recorded two payments—$5,505.00 in 2001 and $2,496.38 in 2002—which
defendant paid directly to Christine, the "custodial parent" ("CP"). R210:117-18; State's Ex.
2. Ms. Casados testified that the amount of those payments were "actually arrived at in a
[late 2003]meeting that was held between myself, the custodial parent, the non-custodial
parent and counsels [sic]to arrive at the actual figures that were paid direct to the custodial
parent so that he received proper credit." R210:118, 140-41. By the end of the nonsupport
period, February 28,2003, defendant had accrued a balance of $26,895.17, even accounting
for the payments defendant had made through ORS and to Christine. R210:120, 141-42;
State's Ex. 2.
5

The payment history reflected that in May 1999, defendant was ordered to pay $909
a month and that by February 2003 the payment had been reduced to $746 a month, reflecting
the graduation of two of the children. R210:l 19; State's Ex. 2.2 ORS sought contact with
defendant during the nonsupport period. R210:120. Annually, ORS sent notice to defendant,
informing him of the current balance owed in his case, possible enforcement action in case
of delinquency, and procedures for requesting modifications. R210:120.

Demand for

payment letters were also sent to defendant, stating the amount due and informing him that
without satisfaction his case could be referred for criminal nonsupport. Two of those letters
informed defendant that he could apply for a payment modification of his support order.
R210:121, 124-25, 127-29. Defendant never responded to these notices. R210:129. ORS
also contacted defendant by telephone four times during the nonsupport period. R210:124.
Defendant never requested a modification during the nonsupport period. R210:145-46.
On cross-examination, defendant elicited from Ms. Casados that ORS determined his
child support obligation from the divorce decree and that the obligation was based on his
stated income. R210:130-36. Defendant's support payments were determined from wage
garnishments, information from Christine, and written receipts for support, including credit
for defendant's repairs to Christine's house, and copies of the checks during the nonsupport
period that he had given directly to Christine. R210:137-38,141-44. Ms. Casados stated that

2

The parties' minor children were born as follows: Kodi, December 8, 1980;
Brooklee, November 26, 1982; Casey, June 19, 1985; Latosha, June 11, 1993; and
Steven, July 19, 1995. State's Ex. 1.
6

at the parties' meeting in late 2003: "We kind of did the math together. I think we all kind
of hashed that out at that meeting." R210:142-43
Following Ms. Casados' testimony, defendant moved for a directed verdict, based on
the prosecution's failure to show that defendant failed to pay child support in 18 months
within any twenty-four month period or had accrued more than $10,000 in child support
arrearage during the nonsupport period. R210:149-53. The trial court found that the
prosecution had established a prima facie case and denied the motion. R210:153-54.
Defendant's case
Defendant testified that he consistently gave Christine money for his children's
support during the nonsupport period whenever he got paid, mostly in cash. R210:155-56.
However, he had no idea how much he had given her, because he did not keep records of
most of it. R210:156. Any gap in the series of checks he gave Christine would have been
due to his having misplaced the checks. R210:173-74. Defendant believed, however, that
the checks he gave Christine, plus cash, reasonably reflected what he gave her during the
nonsupport period. R.210:174-76. He claimed that he would call Christine after he got paid
and would give her as much as she asked for and he was able to give her. R210:157. He
would also give money directly to his children for clothes and shoes and food when they
stayed with him. R210:157-59. He also performed $ 1,500 of repair and maintenance work
on Christine's home during the summer of 2002. R210:159-62; Def. Ex. 5. He also claimed
to have performed other repair and maintenance work for which he did not ask for receipts.
R210:162.
7

Defendant claimed that to the best of his knowledge his children never wanted for
clothes, shoes, medical care, adequate shelter, and access to team sports. R210:165-67. He
asserted that his employment as a concrete worker was seasonal and that it was poor in the
winter months. R210:167-68. Defendant claimed that when he was employed, he earned
about $1,500 to $2,000 a month and not generally $2,600 a month as set out in the divorce
decree. R210:169-72.
Defendant stated, "I think I may have received one [letter from ORS] or something
when I was staying in that camper." R210:176. Defendant acknowledged receiving a
registered letter with the divorce decree, although he claimed to have no knowledge of "7850
South 2nd East, Salt Lake City," the address to which the divorce decree was allegedly sent
to him. R210:171, 176; State's Ex. 1.
On cross-examination, defendant did not recall being served with the divorce decree,
even when shown a return of service indicating personal service at 7850 South 200 East.
R210:180-81; State5 s Ex. 3. Defendant acknowledged that he never attempted to modify the
divorce decree to lower the support payments or to exclude himself as Latosha's biological
father. R210:183-84. Defendant also acknowledged that he may have received letters from
ORS, but he did not read them. R210:189-90.
In response to questions from the jury, defendant acknowledged that his payments
directly to his children were gifts, not child support. R210:188. Defendant also claimed that
he did not pay support to ORS, as directed in the divorce decree because Christine needed

8

his support immediately, and he believed that payment to her would be delayed if he first sent
ittoORS. R210:191.
On rebuttal, however, Ms. Casados testified that a check could issue to the support
recipient within twenty-four hours, at which point it could be mailed or picked up directly
by the recipient. R210:192-93.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court properly denied defendant's motion for a directed verdict. Because the
motion was made at the close of the State's case-in-chief and never renewed at the close of
all the evidence, review of defendant's challenge to the court's ruling is limited to evidence
adduced only during the State's case-in-chief. That evidence, viewed favorably to the State,
showed that defendant committed third degree criminal nonsupport because he had accrued
an arrearage in excess of $10,000 while his minor children were in "needy circumstances."
A payment history prepared by ORS, following a meeting of all parties and their counsel,
reflected defendant's support by check, cash, and services given to his ex-wife. That
payment history also showed that defendant had accrued an arrearage of almost $27,000.
Defendant's challenge that the evidence did not show that he failed to pay support
while he children were in needy circumstances was not preserved in the trial court, and
defendant does not argue plain error on appeal. Therefore, the Court should not consider it.
In any case, the evidence showed, by defendant's ex-wife's reliance on other sources of
assistance and her particular difficulty in providing food, that defendant's children were in
needy circumstances.
9

ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS MADE AT THE END OF DEFENDANT'S
CASE-IN-CHIEF BECAUSE THERE WAS EVIDENCE SHOWING
DEFENDANT WAS GUILTY OF CRIMINAL NONSUPPORT
A person commits third degree criminal nonsupport when any of his minor children
are in "needy circumstances" and he knowingly fails to support them in each of 18 individual
months within a 24-month period or by accruing a $ 10,000 arrearage. Utah Code Ann. § 767-201 (1), (3)(c) (West 2004). Defendant principally contends that the State failed to show
that the total arrearage on defendant's child support obligation was in excess of $105000 or
that he failed to faithfully pay support. Aplt. Br. at 15-22. He also contends that the fully
marshaled evidence fails to show that he did not support his minor children while they were
in needy circumstances. Aplt. Br. at 22-24. Contrary to defendant's contention, the evidence
amply supports the trial court's denial of defendant's motion for a directed verdict.
A, The circumstances of defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of evidence
limits review to evidence adduced during the State's case-in-chief.
At the close of the State's case, defendant moved for a directed verdict. R210:150.
Defendant argued that the prosecution had failed to show that defendant had failed to pay
child support during 18 months within any 24-month period or had accrued more than
$10,000 in child support arrearage during the nonsupport period. R210:149-53. The trial
court denied the motion. R210:153-54. The court held that the prosecution had established
a prima facie case that defendant had made neither regular nor sufficient support payments.
R210:153-54. Consequently, the court denied the motion. Id.
10

At trial, defendant never renewed his motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence after
he moved for a directed verdict. R210. On appeal, defendant identifies the issue as
"[wjhether the trial court erred in denying appellant's motion for a directed verdict....?"
Aplt. Br. at 1. He correctly notes that this issue is preserved at the point in the record where
he moved for a directed verdict. Aplt. Br. at 2, 15 (citing R210:150-51, 153-54).
Review of the trial court's denial of a motion for a directed verdict made after the
State's case-in-chief is limited to evidence adduced during the State's case-in-chief. State
v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, H 40, 70 P.3d 1110"A defendant's motion to dismiss for
insufficient evidence at the conclusion of the State's case in chief requires the trial court to
determine whether the defendant must proceed with the introduction of evidence in his
defense.'") (citations omitted). See State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289, % 9,988 P.2d 949
(limiting review of the sufficiency of evidence in "appeal focuse[d] on the denial of the
motion to dismiss at the close of the State's case-in-chief... to the evidence adduced by the
prosecution in its case-in-chief," and specifically holding "evidence presented by the
defendant... [is] not relevant to our inquiry"); State v. Taylor, 818 P.2d 561, 573-74 (Utah
App. 1991) (finding prima facie case based on facts established at the close of the State's
case-in-chief); Nguyen v. State, 580 So. 2d 122, 122-23 (Ala Ct. App. 1991) ("[W]here the
sufficiency of the evidence is tested by a motion for a judgment of acquittal, we may examine
only that evidence which was before the court at the time the motion was made.") (citation
omitted).

11

Based on the foregoing, this Court's review of the matter precludes consideration of
any testimony made after the motion for a directed verdict—defendant's testimony and Ms.
Casados' rebuttal testimony. This conclusion is reinforced by defendant's failure on appeal
to argue exceptional circumstances or that the trial court committed plain error in sending the
case to the jury following the close of all the evidence. See State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,
f 17, 10 P.3d 346 (requiring a showing of plain error upon an unpreserved claim that
evidence was insufficient to send case to the jury). See also State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539,
547 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) "[B]ecause defendant 'does not argue that "exceptional
circumstances" or "plain error" justifies a review of the[se] issue[s],' this court will 'decline
to consider [them] on appeal.'") (alterations in original) (quoting State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d
1226,1229 n.5 (Utah 1995)). Thus, all of defendant's argument relying on his testimony that
he repaired and improved Christine's house "for credit on his child support obligation" is
irrelevant to the disposition of the trial court's ruling on his motion for a directed verdict.
Aplt.Br. at 16-17, 21.
B. The standard of review.
On a motion for a directed verdict, "[i]f the State fails to produce 'believable evidence
of all the elements of the crime charged,' State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, % 13, 20 P.3d 300
(quotations and citations omitted), the trial court must dismiss the charges." Hamilton, 2003
UT 111, ^| 40. This Court will uphold a trial court's decision to submit a case to the jury if,
"upon reviewing the evidence and all inferences that can be reasonably drawn from it, [the
court] conclude[s] that some evidence exists from which a reasonable jury could find that the
12

elements of the crime had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Davis, 965 P.2d
525, 535 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (quoting State v. Dibello, 780 P.3d 1221,1225 (Utah 1989)).
In reviewing the sufficiency of evidence to support a trial court's denial of a motion to
dismiss or for directed verdict, "the record must be viewed in the light most favorable to the
State." State v. Thatcher, 108 Utah 63, 68 157 P.2d 258, 260 (1945).
C.

The State presented evidence from which the jury
could have found that defendant was guilty of
criminal nonsupport beyond a reasonable doubt.

To prove defendant guilty of third degree criminal nonsupport, the State was required
to show that defendant knowingly failed to provide support for his minor children when they
were in needy circumstances or would be in such circumstances if not for the support of
another and that he failed to provide support during 18 months within any 24-month period
or his total arrearage was more than $10,000.3

3

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 76-7-201 (West 2004), provides:

(1) A person commits criminal nonsupport if, having a spouse, a child, or children
under the age of 18 years, he knowingly fails to provide for the support of the spouse,
child, or children when any one of them:
(a) is in needy circumstances; or
(b) would be in needy circumstances but for support received from a source other
than the defendant or paid on the defendant's behalf.
(3) Criminal nonsupport is a felony of the third degree if the actor:
(c) commits the crime of nonsupport in each of 18 individual months within any
24-month period, or the total arrearage is in excess of $10,000.
13

/. The evidence amply shows that defendant
accrued an arrearage in excess of $10,000.
As noted, defendant principally contends that the State failed to make a prima facie
case by failing to show that his arrearage was in excess of $10,000. Aplt. Br. at 15. He
contends that the State's evidence of his payments consisted only of (1) Christine's
inaccurate and unreliable $2000 estimate to ORS, unsupported by any record-keeping, of
defendant's direct payments to her in cash and by check; and (2) ORS's incomplete records
of defendant's lost and unrecorded payments. Aplt. Br. at 15-22. Defendant repeatedly
argues that these records do not include all of the direct cash and check payments he gave
directly to Christine because she kept no records. Aplt. Br. at 16-22.
Contrary to defendant's contention, the marshaled evidence shows that defendant's
arrearage was clearly in excess of $10,000 long before the end of the nonsupport period:
•

The parties' divorce decree ordered defendant to pay child support
in the amount of $909 a month for all five children named in the
decreee, until each child became 18 years old or graduated from
high school (R210:R210:68, 76-77; State's Ex. 1; Def. Ex. 4B);

•

Defendant was served with the divorce complaint (R210:81-82);

•

Christine always gave defendant receipts for his direct payments and
defendant had receipts for everything he paid for (R210:73, 101);

• ORS became responsible for collections on defendant's child
support obligation (R210:111-13);
•

ORS determined defendant's support obligation from the divorce
decree, based on his stated income, $2,600 a month (R210:130-36
State's Ex. 1; Defendant's Ex. 4B);

•

The ORS caseworker assigned to defendant's case prepared a chart
14

recording defendant's payment history during the nonsupport
period—May 1, 1999 through February 28, 2003 (R210:l 16-17;
State's Ex. 2);
•

The payment history showed all payments ORS obtained from
defendant, which was determined from wage garnishments, information
from Christine, written receipts and copies of the checks defendant
gave directly to Christine, and $1500 credit for repair work (R210:95,
137-38, 141-42, 144);

•

The payment history includes two payments—$5,505.00 in 2001
and $2,496.38 in 2002—which defendant paid directly to Christine,
the "custodial parent" ("CP"). R210:l 17-18; State's Ex. 2.

•

The case worker testified that the amount of those payments were based
on a meeting at which defendant and Christine and their respective
counsel were present "to arrive at the actual figures that were paid
direct to the custodial parent so that [defendant] received proper credit"
and at which defendant presented the checks he had given Christine
and the receipts he had received from her (R210:118, 140-41);

•

The payment history accurately reflected defendant's decreased support
obligation as his two eldest children, Kodi and Brooklee graduated
from high school or reached the age of eighteen (R210:137-37, 148-49;
State's Ex. 1 & 2; Def s Ex. 4B);

• During the nonsupport period—May 1, 1999 through February 28,
2003—ORS sent defendant annual notices, informing him
of the current balance owed in his case, possible enforcement
action in case of delinquency, and procedures for requesting
modifications (R210:120);
• During the nonsupport period, ORS also sent defendant demand-forpayment letters, stating the amount due and informing him that
without satisfaction his case could be referred for criminal actiont;
two of those letters also informed defendant that he could apply for a
payment modification of his support order (R210:121, 124-25, 127-29);
• Defendant never responded to the foregoing notices, nor did he ever
request a modification of his support obligation (R210:129, 145-46);
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•

Defendant had accrued an arrearage of $ 10,802.55 by July 305 2000;
defendant's arrearage was never less than $10,000 in the remaining 31
months before the end of the nonsupport period, February 28, 2003, at
which point the defendant's arrearage was $26,895.17 (R210:120,
141-42; State's Ex. 2).

The foregoing facts, viewed in a light most favorable to the State, amply show that
the State established a prima facie case that defendant had accrued an arrearage of $10,000
during the nonsupport period. In brief, the facts show that defendant was aware that he had
been ordered to pay support for his four minor children, including another child for whom
he never declined responsibility. Defendant was also notified of the amount he was required
to pay. The payment history reflected all the sources of payment that defendant made toward
his support obligation. Long before the end of the nonsupport period, defendant's arrearage
became greater than $10,000, notwithstanding credits to his account.
Defendant repeatedly challenges the ORS payment history because it was undisputed
that Christine did not keep records and her estimate—that during the nonsupport period
defendant gave her about $2,000—was patently untrustworthy because the checks he gave
her (mainly during 2001) were far in excess of that estimate. Aplt. Br. at 16-22.
The State does not dispute these facts. Christine acknowledged that she did not keep
records. (R210:89). Her estimate, that defendant "helped [her] out with a $100 here and
there," approximating about $2,000 during the nonsupport period, was inaccurate. R210:86,
88, 92. Defendant's checks marked "child support," made to Christine between January 28,
2001 and April 30, 2002, alone total $5,130. Def s Ex. 3.
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These facts, however, are insufficent to defeat the State's prima facie case of the
element that defendant had accrued an arrearage of $10,000. The checks span a period of
sixteen months. Def s Ex. 3. To challenge the State's case-in-chief for that period,
defendant introduced only the checks. R210:93-97; Def s Ex. 3. He never introduced any
receipts for cash that he allegedly gave Christine during that period. R210. Viewed
favorably to the State, it is improbable that during the 16-month period, which began months
after defendant had already accrued an arrearage of $10,000, that defendant was also giving
Christine support payments in cash. It is still more improbable that even if he were also
giving her cash in addition to the checks that he could have fulfilled his support obligation
of $12,464 during that 16-month period, from January 1, 2001 through April 30, 2002.
State's Ex. 2. Moreover, any inaccuracy in Christine's estimate of defendant's support is
irrelevant.

The payment history indicates that ORS gave defendant credit for two

amounts—$5,505.00 and $2,496.38, a total of $8,001.38, "paid direct to [Christine]" in 2001
and 2002. State's Ex. 2. These amounts reflect the outcome of a meeting at which defendant
and his counsel were present and from which ORS gave defendant credit for support given
in the form of cash, check, and repair work in excess of any sum he adduced evidence for.
R210:118, 141-42; State's Ex. 2. Defendant's arrearage was in excess of $10,000 despite
these credits. In sum, defendant has failed to show that evidence that he had accrued an
arrearage of $10,000 was insufficient to survive a motion for a directed verdict.
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2. Defendant's contention that the evidence fails to establish that he
knowingly failed to provide for his children while they were in needy
circumstances is unpreserved and contrary to the evidence.
Defendant argues that "the marshaled evidence, even when viewed in a light most
favorable to the State, failed to show that [defendant] knowingly failed to provide for his
children while they were in needy circumstances." Aplt. Br. at 22. In support, defendant
notes only that Christine testified that he was not consistent in paying support and "'that there
were several times when we were in a bind,' but that' it seemed like if [the money] was really
needed, [defendant] seemed able to come up with i t ' " Aplt. Br. at 22-23 (citing R210:72-73,
90). He further argues that he provided support in a variety of alternative ways and the
checks show that he made consistent payments. Aplt. Br. at 23.
a. To the extent defendant claims that the State failed to show that his
children were in needy circumstances, the claim is unpreserved.
"[I]n general, appellate courts will not consider an issue, including constitutional
arguments, raised for the first time on appeal unless the trial court committed plain error or
the case involves exceptional circumstances." State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, ^f 13,95 P.3d 276
(citing Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 11).4 "[T]he issue must be 'sufficiently raised to a "level of
consciousness" before the trial court and must be supported by evidence

4

"'" Id. (citation

"To demonstrate plain error, a defendant must establish that '(i) [a]n error
exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is
harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
outcome for the appellant, or phrased differently, our confidence in the verdict is
undermined.5" Holgate, 200 UT 74, ^f 13 (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09
(Utah 1993)).
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omitted). The reviewing court will decline to review an argument unpreserved in the trial
court and unasserted under the plain error doctrine on appeal. See State v. Hodges, 2002 UT
117, \ 5,63 P3d 66 (declining to review unpreserved argument "[b]ecause defendant has not
asserted either of the exceptions to the general rule-plain error or exceptional
circumstances").
Here, in moving for a directed verdict, defendant argued only that the evidence was
insufficient to show that defendant had accrued an arrearage of $ 10,000. R210:149-53. He
never argued that the evidence was insufficient to show that his children were in needy
circumstances or would be but for the assistance provided by others during the nonsupport
period. Id. Thus, defendant never gave the trial court the opportunity to consider the issue
of needy circumstances in ruling on his motion. On appeal, defendant does not argue that
the trial court committed plain error in denying his motion because it did not consider
whether his children were in needy circumstances or that exceptional circumstances
precluded the argument. Aplt. Br. at 22-24. This Court should therefore decline to consider
defendant's contention. In any case, the evidence showed that defendant's children were in
needy circumstances.
b. The evidence shows that defendant's children were in needy
circumstances or would have been so but for the assistance of others.
Defendant "knowingly fail[ed] to provide for the support of the spouse, child, or
children when any one of them [was] in needy circumstances[,] or would [have been] in
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needy circumstances but for support received from a source other than the defendant or paid
on the defendant's behalf." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-201(1) (West 2004).
Christine testified to the following facts as to her and her children's financial
circumstances during the nonsupport period:
• She and her children had to receive help from friends (R210:70);
• She had to seek help from her family a couple of different times (R210:70);
• Her mother helped her (R210:70);
• She borrowed money from her father for clothing when she first
started working (R210:70);
• She had to borrow money from her friends (R210:71);
• Her church had to help her on a couple of occasions
with finances (R210:70-71);
• She paid for her children's medical and dental insurance, even though
the divorce decree ordered defendant to pay that expense (R210:71;
State's Ex. 1);
• She had hardships providing clothing for her children because of the large
size of her family—"We struggled a few times with school clothes. . ..
(R210:71);
• She had hardships providing food—"Yeah, we've had a hard time. We've
had to ask for help and we've had to, you know, we've had to kind
of watch what we do in order to make it" (R. 210:71-72);
• There had been a couple of times when "we've had to say no to a
basketball team or something like that because of finances" (R210:72);
• She did not know how things might have turned out without help from
family, friends, and her church—"[M]y children were already
impacted quite a bit. I don't know how it would have turned out,
but we definitely did need some help as certain times (R210:76).
20

Christine's self-effacing statements that family, parents, friends, and church each
helped her out a "couple" of times, that she had some "hardship" providing appropriate
clothing for her five children, that a "couple" of times her children were deprived of
opportunities at sports, and that providing food was an on-going challenge, attest to her and
her children's needy circumstances. Her complete statement, upon which defendant relies,
"[Defendant's support] wasn't regular and it wasn't consistent but... it seemed like if it was
really needed, he seemed to be able to come up with it," only highlights Christine's
abstemious lifestyle in the absence of defendant's inconsistent and delinquent support.
R210:73.
Defendant attempts to buoy up his claim that Christine and the children were not in
needy circumstances by referencing services he provided to improve Christine's house and
his purchasing of clothes for the children. Aplt. Br. at 23. However, all of the evidence
defendant cites was introduced in the defense's case, after defendant moved for a directed
verdict and the trial court denied it. R210:149-54. Consequently, this evidence is "not
relevant to [this Court's] inquiry" of the issue on appeal, to wit: the propriety of the trial
court's denial of defendant's motion for a directed verdict. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289,
\ 9. Moreover, at most it only puts the matter at issue, thereby presenting the jury with a
factual dispute to resolve.
In sum, the fully marshaled evidence shows that defendant's children were in needy
circumstances. Further, the evidence supports the trial court's denial of defendant's motion
for a directed verdict. That evidence, viewed favorably to the State, shows that not only were
21

defendant's children in needy circumstances, but also that defendant failed to support them
in accruing an arrearage in excess of $10,000.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing discussion, the State respectfully requests that this Court
affirm defendant's conviction.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 7£_ day of May, 2005.
MARKL. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

KENNETH BRONSTON
Assistant Attorney General
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

CRIMINAL CODE

OFFENSES AGAINST THE FAMILY
PART 2. NONSUPPORT AND SALE OF CHILDREN
§ 76—7—201. Criminal nonsupport
(1) A person commits criminal nonsupport if, having a spouse, a child, or
children under the age of 18 years, he knowingly fails to provide for the support
of the spouse, child, or children when any one of them:
(a) is in needy circumstances; or
(b) would be in needy circumstances but for support received from a
source other than the defendant or paid on the defendant's behalf.
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (3), criminal nonsupport is a class A
misdemeanor.
(3) Criminal nonsupport is a felony of the third degree if the actor:
(a) has been convicted one or more times of nonsupport, whether in this
state, any other state, or any court of the United States;
(b) committed the offense while residing outside of Utah; or
(c) commits the crime of nonsupport in each of 18 individual months
within any 24-month period, or the total arrearage is in excess of $10,000.
(4) For purposes of this section "child" includes a child born out of wedlock
whose paternity has been admitted by the actor or has been established in a
civil suit.
(5)(a) In a prosecution for criminal nonsupport under this section, it is an
affirmative defense that the accused is unable to provide support. Voluntary
unemployment or underemployment by the defendant does not give rise to that
defense.
(b) Not less than 20 days before trial the defendant shall file and serve on
the prosecuting attorney a notice, in writing, of his intention to claim the
affirmative defense of inability to provide support. The notice shall specifically identify the factual basis for the defense and the names and addresses of
the witnesses who the defendant proposes to examine in order to establish
the defense.
(c) Not more than ten days after receipt of the notice described in Subsection (5)(b), or at such other time as the court may direct, the prosecuting
attorney shall file and serve the defendant with a notice containing the names
and addresses of the witnesses who the state proposes to examine in order to
contradict or rebut the defendant's claim.
(d) Failure to comply with the requirements of Subsection (5)(b) or (5)(c)
entitles the opposing party to a continuance to allow for preparation. If the
court finds that a party's failure to comply is the result of bad faith, it may
impose appropriate sanctions.
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-7-201; Laws 1974, c. 32, § 21; Laws 1995, c. 289, § 1, eff.
May 1, 1995; Laws 1999, c. 89, § 1, eff. May 3, 1999.
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OLD SYSTEM #

Date Prepared:
June 11, 2 0 0 4 ^ |
Prepared by: R, CASADOS

NILE GENE NELSON
0080263018
Time Period 5/99-2/03

EE:

CHRIS NELSON
0040014869

j

TOTAL DUE

I

$28,645.66

Principal
$26,895.17

|

Interest
$1,750.49

1

DEBT COMPUTATION
YEAR CURRENT DUE

1
1
i
3
i

3
3
i

)
)
D
i

)
)
)
)

!

1
1

L__ L

$909.00
$909.00
$834.00
$834.00
$834.00
$834.00
$834.00
$834.00
$834.00
$834.00
$834.00
$834.00
$834.00
$834.00
$834.00
$834.00
$834.00
$834.00
$834.00
$834.00
$834.00
$834.00
$834.00
$834.00

$834.00

PAYMENTS

| PRINCIPAL BALANCE INT RATE

$357.45

$300.00
$500.00
$400.00
$300.00

[

$551,551 3.000%|
$1,460.55 3.000%
$2,294.55 3.000%
$3,128.55 3.000%
$3,962.55 3.000%
$4,796.55 3.000%
$5,630.55 3.000%
$6,164.55 3.000%
$6,498.55 3.000%
$6,932.55 3.000%
$7,466.55 3.000%
$8,300.55 3.000%
$9,134.55 3.000%l
$9,968.55 3.000%
$10,802.55 3.000%
$11,636.55 3.000%
$12,470.55 3.000%
$13,304.55 3.000%
$14,138.55 3.000%
$14,972.55 3.000%
$15,806.55 3.000%
$16,640.55 3.000%
$17,474.55 3.000%
$18,308.55 3.000%
$19,142.55 |_ 3.000% I

INTEREST

TOTAL BALANCE

COMMENTS

$39.52
$41.60
$43.69

$551.55
RWD
$1,461.93 Child: Kodi graduates I
$2,299.58
$3,139.32
$3,981.14
$4,825.04'
$5,671.04
$6,219.11
$6,568.52
$7,018.77
$7,570.10
$8,422.77
$9,277.52
$10,134.36
$10,993.28
$11,854.28
$12,717.37
$13,582.55
$14,449.81
$15,319.16
$16,190.59
$17,064.11
$17,939.71
$18,817.39

$45.77 I

$19,697.17

$1.38
$3.65
$5.74
$7.82
$9.91
$11.99
$14.08
$15.41
$16.25
$17.33
$18.67
$20.75
$22.84
$24.92
$27.01
$29.09
$31.18
$33.26
$35.35
$37.43
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OLD SYSTEM #
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June 11, 2004
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NILE G E N E N E L S O N
0080263018
T i m e Period 5/99-2/03

EJ

CHRIS N E L S O N
0040014869
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TOTAL DUE
Principal
$26,895.17

I
I
I

$28,645.66
Interest
$1,750.49

I
I

DEBT COMPUTATION
TEAR

I

I
:
>

l
i

2
>

2
2
)

2
2
3
3

CURRENT DUE

PAYMENTS

PRINCIPAL BALANCE

$834.00

$19,976.55

$746.00
$746.00
$746.00
$746.00
$746.00
$746.00
$746.00
$746.00
$746.00
$746.00
$746.00
$746.00
$746.00
$746.00
$746.00
$746.00
$746.00
$746.00
$746.00
$746.00

$20,722.55
$21,468.55
$22,214.55
$22,960.55
$23,706.55
$18,947.55
$19,693.55
$20,439.55
$21,185.55
$21,931.55
$22,677.55
$23,423.55
$24,169.55
$24,915.55
$25,661.55
$26,407.55
$27,153.55
$25,403.17
$26,149.17
$26,895.17

$5,505.00

$2,496.38

INT RATE
3.000%
3.000%
3.000%
3.000%
3.000%
3.000%
3.000%
3.000%
3.000%
3.000%
3.000%
3.000%
3.000%
3.000%
3.000%
3.000%
3.000%
3.000%
3.000%
3.000%
3.000%

INTEREST

TOTAL BALANCE

COMMENTS
Child: Brooklee
graduates

$47.86

$20,579.02:

$49.94
$51.81
$53.67
$55.54
$57.40
$59.27
$47.37
$49.23
$51.10
$52.96
$54.83
$56.69
$58.56
$60.42
$62.29
$64.15
$66.02
$67.88
$63.51
$65.37

$21,374.96
$22,172.77
$22,972.44
$23,773.98
$24,577.38
$19,877.65 Paid direct to C P 2001 I
$20,671.01
$21,466.25
$22,263.35
$23,062.31
$23,863.14
$24,665.83
$25,470.39
$26,276.82
$27,085.11
$27,895.26
$28,707.28
$27,024.78 Paid direct t o C P 2002
$27,834.29
$28,645.66
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ASSISTANCE

CHILD
SUPPORT
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|ANNUALLY

I SUPPORT
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TO STATE
| ACCRUING

I

I
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-

I

I
S

$0.00

$Q.qo

$0.00
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$0.00

$0,00

$0.00

$0,00

(

$0.00
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CASE*
OLD SYSTEM #
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[CHILD SUPPORT
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$0.00
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~"

j CHRIS NELSON

R. CASADOS

INTEREST WAIVED
PRINCIPAL BALANCE TOTAL INTEREST BY THE $TATE
$26,895.17

$1,750.49

$0.00

DATE PREPARED:
INTEREST OWED
TO THE FAMILY
$1,750.49

June 11, 2004
BALANCE WITH STATE]
INTEREST WAIVED _J
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